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This study investigates the relation between firm characteristics and board composition in 
Australia for a sample of the same 432 listed firms in 2001 and 2007 and the impact of the 
Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice issued by the Australian Stock 
Exchange in 2003. Two feature of this regulation were (a) it recommended independent boards 
for all firms, without regard to firm characteristics (an approach commonly described as ‘one 
size fits all’) and (b) it allowed non-compliance through ‘if not why not’ reporting. Using various 
designations of independence and firm size subsamples we find for ‘Top 100’ firms in 2001 up 
to 49% (Adjusted R2 48.8) of variation in board independence may be explained by firm 
characteristics, but generally the explanatory power was much lower. Evidence is provided that 
although more firms had majority independent boards the relation between board composition 
and firm characteristics may have weakened over the period. This highlights a potential concern 
that the regulation has imposed unnecessary costs or inappropriate governance mechanisms on 
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1. Introduction 
The objective of this paper is to provide evidence on the relation between firm 
characteristics and board composition in Australia, and evaluates any changes subsequent to the 
issuance of the Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice (PGCG&BP) by the 
Australian Stock Exchange in 2003. While these regulations included a recommendation of a 
majority of independent directors for the “Top 500” boards (‘one size fits all’ approach), there 
was provision for firms not to comply with the recommendations as long as this was disclosed 
and an explanation provided. With more firms moving to majority independent boards but the 
average level of board independence remaining approximately the same, how has this impacted 
the relation between firm characteristics and board composition?1   
 
In the aftermath of high profile corporate failures such as Enron Corporation, Parmalat 
SpA and HIH Insurance Ltd, the governance of corporations has been subjected to considerable 
scrutiny. There have been number of regulatory responses, including legislation such as the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) in the United States, the Companies Act 2006 in the United 
Kingdom and the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate 
Disclosure) Act 2004 (also known as CLERP 9) in Australia.  There have also been responses 
from market operators such as the New York Stock Exchange which included Corporate 
Governance Listing Standards in the NYSE Listing Company Manual (S303A) in 2004 and the 
Combined Code on Corporate Governance, incorporating suggestions for good practice from the 
                                               
1 Matolcsy, Tyler and Wells (2008), from a very similar sample find a 9% increase in the number of boards with 
more than 50% of independent directors but a little change in the mean and median percentage of independent 
directors on the sample firm boards.  
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Higgs report (2003) in the United Kingdom.2 Similarly, the Australian Stock Exchange issued 
the PGCG&BP in 2003. These regulatory developments which addressed governance issues such 
as board composition and auditors were essentially a response to criticism and public perceptions 
of governance failure. However, there was no empirical evidence that governance problems were 
endemic, nor was there any theoretical or empirical support for the regulations mitigating the risk 
of problems in the future but doubtless they were influenced by the recommendations in reviews 
of corporate governance in the 1990’s.  
 
In this study we examine the relation between board independence and firm 
characteristic. This aspect of corporate governance was selected as the requirement for a majority 
of directors to be independence and the implication of the higher the level of independence the 
better, was common to the regulatory reforms in many countries.  Furthermore, it featured 
prominently in reviews of corporate governance in the 1990’s in the United States (The Blue 
Ribbon Committee) the United Kingdom (The Cadbury Report) and Australia (The Bosch 
Committee) and is typically identified as a central component of good corporate governance. 
 
While the changes in board composition were documented in Matolcsy (2008) the effect 
of the relation between firm characteristics and board composition has not, to our knowledge, 
been examined in a pre and post corporate governance regulatory environment. Empirical 
evidence from pre-regulation Australian studies (Arthur 2001 and Cotter 2003) and 
internationally (Boone 2007) have found board composition to be associated with firm 
characteristics, but it is unclear if firm characteristics drive the level of board independence for 
                                               
2 The Combined Code is produced by the Financial Reporting Council, the independent UK regulator, also 
responsible for the statutory oversight and regulation of auditors and of the professional accountancy and actuarial 
bodies. Similar to Australia there is a ‘comply or explain’ (if not why not) provision. 
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all size firms and for various designations of independence. While board composition and its 
impact on firm outcomes would appear to be both the original motivation for regulation and 
extensively researched post regulation (see Coles et al 2008), there is relatively little analysis of 
the impact of firm characteristics on board composition (see Linck et al 2008). This paper 
extends current research by examining the relation in a pre and post regulatory environment. 
Further we include medium and small companies in the sample, which have not been scrutinized 
in previous Australian research.  
 
 In an unregulated corporate governance environment, board composition (on average) 
should be optimal. Even in cases where boards are thought to be captured by interested parties, if 
the benefits of changing the board were greater than the cost, the board composition would 
change. But board composition should be related to firm characteristics, including other 
governance mechanism employed by the firm to control agency conflicts (Bathala and Rao 
1995). Given the firm characteristics and the costs and benefits of other mechanisms, boards may 
be expected to be so composed as to provide efficient corporate governance (Linck et al 2008).  
 
 This paper is motivated by two distinct factors; the limited research in Australia on the 
association between board composition and firm characteristics particularly in the post corporate 
governance regulatory environment and the generally negative reaction by directors in Australia 
to the regulatory changes indicating, at least anecdotally, that one size did not fit all.3  
 
                                               
3  CLERP 9 but primarily the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best 
Practice Recommendations in March 2003 
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 There has been limited research on the relation of firm characteristics and board 
composition in Australia. Arthur (1997, 2001) found board composition was associated with 
CEO tenure, information asymmetry and the comparative advantage of independent directors as 
monitors. Although Arthur’s sample was from 1989 and included only 125 companies, it added 
to the evidence suggesting optimal board composition is not independent of the firm 
characteristics. More recent research in Australia, Cotter (2003) have examined firms up to 1997 
but neither included medium or small firms in their sample. Consistent with Arthur (1997) Cotter 
(2003) found independent boards positively associated with low management ownership and an 
absence of substantial shareholders and independent audit committees with low debt levels. 
Larcker, Richardson and Tuna (2007), demonstrated that board characteristics are not 
independent of firm characteristics and other corporate governance mechanisms. Lim (2007) find 
growth firms with relatively less assets in place require more independent directors than firms 
with more assets in place, consistent with Anderson (1993).  This study further examines this 
relation and provides evidence for regulators to better base future corporate governance 
requirements. 
 
 Regulations both in Australia and overseas imply the ‘optimal’ board structure is majority 
independent with independent chairs, audit, remuneration and nomination committees.4  These 
                                               
4 Corporate Law Economic Reform Program  No. 9 (CLERP 9) became law on 30 June 2004. It applies to financial 
years commencing on or after 1 July 2004 requiring: the inclusion of a remuneration report (for all directors and the 
top 5 remunerated executives), a non-binding shareholder vote on the remuneration report (shareholder approval 
required for retirement benefits greater than 7 times final average salary or  years of service if less than 7 years), 
disclosure non-audit work undertaken by an auditor and if this work is compatible with auditor independence, 
auditor rotation (generally 5 years), operating and financial performance discussion and analysis, additional 
information necessary to give a “true and fair view”, ASIC fines for breaches of continuous disclosure requirements 
(‘on the spot’ fines up to $100,000 for companies and civil penalties to $1 million for companies and $200,000 for 
individuals), CEO and CFO to declare financial statements are in accordance with the Act and Accounting Standards 
and other minor provisions (e.g. whistleblowers protection) not relevant here.  Also see footnote 2 above re ASX 
Corporate Governance Council; Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations.   
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regulations suggest a ‘one size fits all’ approach to board composition (or in Australia, one size 
fits all top 500 or 300 companies).5 Further, following the introduction of the Australian Stock 
Exchange (ASX) Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations 
in March 2003 (hereafter PGCG), complaints of forced changes were voiced by many, probably 
the most vocal, the chair and CEO of Harvey Norman, Mr Gerry Harvey. Consistent with Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) Harvey argued his high percentage ownership in the company was all the 
corporate governance needed to align his actions as manager, with the interests of all 
shareholders and derided regulations imposing a uniform structure on all but small listed 
companies.6 Other executive chairs in Australia, such as Frank Lowy (Westfield,) James Packer 
(PBL), Kerry Stokes (Seven Network) and Rupert Murdoch (News Corp) all hold, or represent 
large shareholdings in their company and appear to have received lower ratings because of the 
lack of an independent chair.  
 
 This research contributes to the corporate governance academic and professional debate 
in three significant areas: First, there have been no studies that link board composition to firm 
characteristics in a pre and post regulatory environment. In Australia we do not know of any 
studies that examine small and medium size firms to see if the relation between board 
composition and firm characteristics is consistent for all firms regardless of size. The insight 
                                               
 
5 The original ASX requirement was for audit committees for the “Top 500” companies, but this was subsequently 
reduced for to the “Top 300” companies (companies at the time with market capitalization above approximately 
$100 million Australian). 
 
6 Howath Rating Report (in conjunction with the University of Newcastle) uses an undisclosed formula on corporate 
governance to rate Australian companies. The formula appears to penalize companies without independent chairs 
and majority independent boards. The ratings are reported in the media and have been used by Beekes and Brown 
2005.  
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provided from this study will enhance our understanding of the influence of firm characteristics 
on board composition.  
 
 Second, it provides regulators with evidence of the appropriateness of a ‘one size fits all’ 
corporate governance model. The report of the HIH Royal Commission, released in April 2003 
made 61 policy recommendations, 17 related to corporate governance. Improved disclosure of 
directors’ remunerations, auditor independence declaration, non-audit services disclosure 
(identification, fees and an explanation of how they do not compromise audit independence), 
restrictions on retired auditors becoming directors of former clients7, auditor rotation8 and 
management discussion and analysis9 were all recommendations of Commissioner, Justice 
Owens. Many of the recommendations were incorporated into the Corporations Act 2001 by the 
Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure Bill 2003 (CLERP 9).10 This study provides evidence to 
regulators by highlighting that board composition and firm characteristics are related and a ‘one 
size fit all’ regulations may not be appropriate.  In fact such regulation may lead to sub-optimal 
board composition because they under or over compensate for other monitoring and/or advising 
governance measures. This can manifest in inadequate governance or unnecessary costs.  
 
                                               
7 Justice Owen recommended only one former auditor being appointed a director and a four year cooling off period, 
CLERP 9 has reduced this to two year and dispensed with the proposal that a cooling-off period should also apply to 
retired partners who were not directly involved in the audit of the former client. 
 
8 Justice Owen recommended extending the applicability of the audit rotation to include key senior audit personnel. 
CLERP 9 requires rotation of the lead engagement partner and review partner only. 
 
9 Justice Owen recommended listed companies prepare an audited operating and financial review, CLERP 9 did not 
require the review to be audited. 
 
10 Other recommendations were referred to the professional accounting and actuarial bodies, the Financial Reporting 
Council, the Australian Accounting Standards Board, the Audit and Assurance Standard Board, ASIC and APRA. 
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 Third, independence boards may be desirable in certain circumstances (such as 
companies in financial distress), but the lack of say independent chairs in companies that have 
recently failed (HIH, OneTel, Harris Scarfe) does not necessarily indicate the need for these 
corporate governance mechanisms in all companies prevents financial failure.11 Media reporting 
and political reforms following corporate failures, often concentrate on publicly observerable 
common factors, but may ignore complex technical similarities such as firm characteristics.12 
Further corporate reform in Australia appears to have been driven by the political and legal 
professions without any consideration of the economic consequences.13  
 
 Consistent with predictions based on agency theory we find there is a positive association 
between board independence and firm characteristics which reflects the need for higher levels of 
monitoring by the board and the absence of alternate monitoring mechanisms. On the other side 
we find a negative association between board independence and firm characteristics which 
reflects the need for a lower level of monitoring by the board and the presence of alternate 
monitoring mechanisms. Further there was significant change in this association pre and post 
                                               
11 Following the Royal Commission into the failure of HIH Insurance, charges were laid by ASIC and two former 
directors Ray Williams (executive chair) and Rodney Adler were given prison sentences for a period of up to four 
and a half years for their actions as directors and APRA disqualified Frederick Lo, the former company secretary 
(and others) from being or acting as a director or senior manager of a general insurer. Adam Trescowthick, the 
former executive chair of Harris Scarfe was charged on 18 July 2003 with 37 counts following ASIC’s 
investigations. Brad Keeling (joint executive chair) settled his civil claim against ASIC agreeing to pay ASIC’s 
costs, compensation of $92 million and accepted the ban from being a director for 10 years. Other defendants in the 
One.Tel proceedings are still before the courts.  
 
12 Adler has his fingers in two corporate collapses. “With so much attention on Rodney Adler’s part in HIH’s 
downfall, it is easy to forget Mr Adler was associated with another major corporate collapse…. founding director 
and shareholder in One.Tel.”  Transcript, ABC Radio “PM” Wednesday, 9 October 2002.  
 
13 The Ramsey Report, the HIH Royal Commission (Justice Owen’s recommendations), ASIC charges and 
subsequent sentencing of directors are examples of lawyers involvement in corporate governance. The exception 
appears to be the ASX Corporate Governance council with representation from twenty-one bodies, only one, the 
Law Council of Australia directly represent lawyers. 
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regulation for some firms, particularly small firms and firms that had minority independent 
boards in 2001, suggesting the regulation could be seen as both counterproductive and costly.             
 
 The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides the theory 
development and hypotheses and Section 3 discusses the sample selection and research design, 
Section 4 outlines the results, the sensitivity testing for size, industry and alternate definitions of 
independence and the limitations and conclusion are in Section 5. 
 
2. Directors as a Governance Mechanism: Theory and Hypothesis 
  
 The theoretical foundation of the role of directors is outlined by Fama and Jensen (1983). 
They contend that the agency problems are best mitigated by the contract structure that specify 
the nature of residual claims and separates the ratification and monitoring of the decisions 
(‘decision control’) from the initiation and implementation of the decisions (‘decision 
management’). Because there is a separation of residual risk bearing from decision management, 
this leads to decision systems that separate decision management from decision control. These 
contracts determine which types of organisations survive and which organisations within those 
types survive.14 When combined with available production technology and external legal 
constraints the cost function is determined. Therefore the most successful organisations are the 
ones who create the most efficient ‘nexus of contracts’.15 Central to the contract process is the 
                                               
14 E.g. companies (public or private) partnerships (of various forms) trusts, mutual societies, sole traders etc.  
 
15 Because within an economy all firms face similar legal constraints (unless they are protected in some way e.g. 
television licenses) and production technologies (unless trade is restricted, e.g. military patents which cannot be 
purchased on the open market). 
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board of directors. Adams and Ferreira (2007) divide the role of directors into two major 
functions: monitoring and advising. Monitoring should minimise sub-optimal behaviour by 
management (both at the decision ratification and monitoring outcomes phases) and requires 
directors to be independent of management, while advising (on initiation and implementation) 
does not have the same imperative. Shareholders, who are the residual risk bearers, are able to 
trade shares but have limited involvement in company management beyond the right to elect 
directors.16  The Australian regulatory framework partially reflects this theoretical foundation. 
 
 In Australia directors have a number of duties and responsibilities under statute, primarily 
the Corporations Act 2001 (including insider trading) but also the Securities Industry Act (share 
trading), Trade Practices Act (misleading and deceptive conduct) and the Occupational Health 
and Safety Acts and Regulations (employee safety). Directors’ primary duty is fiduciary; to act 
with due care and diligence in the interest of the company, this also involves avoiding conflicts 
of interest (not gaining an advantage for themselves or causing detriment to the company).17  
Any dealings between a director and the company must be disclosed to the board and the director 
may not be present while the matter is being considered by the board.18 Due diligence includes 
obtaining a general understanding of the company’s business and monitoring management. 
Another important duty is the requirement not to trade while insolvent.19 Directors may delegate 
their powers but remain responsible for the exercise of that power. There is also a common law 
                                               
16 Participate in a game in which they have limited control, except elect directors, approve changes in the company 
constitution, lowering of dividends, some minor provisions (such as the ratification of share issues in accordance 
with ASX Listing Rule 7.4) and since 2005 in Australia a non binding vote on remuneration. 
 
17 Various sections of the Corporations Act 2001 as amended including 5.3, 179 & 160.  
 
18 Corporations Act Sec 248(2) and 250(3).  
19  On May 5,2003 the Victorian Supreme Court found John Elliot guilty of allowing Water Wheel Holdings to trade 
while insolvent in contravention of  Sec 558(G). 
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duty to establish and monitor internal control systems.  Directors are also governed by common 
law rules, the company’s individual constitution, guidelines issued by the Australian Companies 
and Securities Commission (ASIC) and for listed companies, the Australian Stock Exchanges 
(ASX) Listing Rules. Directors may also be influenced by a number of professional and other 
bodies that have seen fit to provide corporate governance guidance, including but not exclusively 
the Australian Institute of Directors, Chartered Secretaries Australia (“Leaders in governance”), 
Standards Australia (Good Governance Principles) and even CPA Australia. Finally the media 
(the fourth estate) or public opinion influences corporate activity. This cascade of corporate 
regulation is also present in the US and UK. 
 
 Following some recent high profile corporate collapses (e.g. One-Tel, HIH), attention in 
Australia has been drawn to company boards by both the ‘Corporate Law Economic Reform 
Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004’ (hereafter CLERP 9) and corporate 
governance guidelines issued by a number of committees and bodies, most notably the 
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Council Principles of Good Corporate 
Governance and Best Practice Recommendations, March 2003. Recommendations by the PGCG 
appear to have been based on limited empirical evidence (board composition of failed 
companies), normative theories and a political process require public listed companies to have a 
majority of independent directors.20 
 
                                               
20 Statements such as “bring together 21 groups from disparate business backgrounds and carrying the varying aims 
and priorities that accompany those constitutencies.”(Forward to PGCG) and the absence of any reference to any 




Although neither contractually binding nor enforceable under the Corporations Law, they require 
listed entities to comply or provide an explanation of why they have not complied (“if not why 
not”). Before the issuance of the PGCG few board composition requirements were imposed.21 As 
discussed in Matolcsy (2008), the regulations appear to have had a significant influence on the 
aspects of board composition which may be considered inexpensive to implement and an impact 
on medium size companies.22  
 
 The theoretical framework proposed by Fama and Jensen (1983) provides limited 
guidance on optimal board composition, but it is clear the nexus of contracts will be different for 
companies facing different circumstances. Company law has long required directors, but in most 
countries does not require independent (or even non-executive) directors. Before regulation, the 
composition of boards was the practical evolutionary solution to corporate governance at the 
highest corporate level. To suggest boards on average were sub-optimal, given the costs and 
benefits of all corporate governance measures, is to suggest market failure or a specific form, 
market capture by interested parties.23   
 
 The empirical literature provides some insight into the relation of firm characteristics and 
‘optimal’ board composition.  For example, Denis and Sarin (1999) found ownership was the 
major determinate of board composition and changes in ownership lead to changes in 
composition, Vassallo (2005) hypothesized accounting numbers serve as an adequate monitor of 
                                               
21 Corporations Law 2001 required a minimum of three directors for a public company [Subsection 201A(2)] two of 
who must be Australian residents. ASX Listing Rules 14.4 (introduced 1/7/96) require directors to be elected every 
three years.   
 
22 Between 2001 and 2005 a substantial increase in the percentage of companies with remuneration committees was 
observed, while only medium size company boards became significantly more independent. 
  
23 A number of studies have shown an entrenched CEO was able to extract monopoly rents. 
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management’s performance only in limited circumstances, specifically where P/B and P/E are 
low. He found strong support for net assets and earnings being good indicators of expected future 
performance in these circumstances, but where P/B and P/E were high additional monitoring was 
required. Further, Arthur (2001) suggested, although neither the Corporations Law nor other 
regulatory authorities provide many constraints, either directly nor indirectly on the composition 
and leadership of boards (in Australia in 1989), board composition would be influenced by a 
number of factors, that contributed to the reduction in contracting costs. These factors included; 
information asymmetry, the independent directors’ comparative advantage in monitoring, and the 
bargaining ability of the CEO. Cotter and Silvester (2003) found more independent boards were 
associated with low management ownership and an absence of substantial shareholders. Further 
in examining the independence of the audit committee they found an association between the 
independence of the audit committee and reduced monitoring by debtholders when leverage was 
low based on a sample of 107 large firms in Australia in 1997.  
 
 The most comprehensive study appears to be Lincks et al (2008) which examined nearly 
7,000 firms from 1990 to 2004. They found although their model explained as much as 45% of 
the observed board structure, small and large firms have dramatically different board structures. 
Firms with high growth opportunities, high R&D, high stock return volatility and high 
managerial ownership are associated with less independent boards, while firms that are larger, 
firms that the CEO has greater influence over and insiders have greater opportunity to extract 
private benefits have more independent boards. 
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 To date, there is no theoretical and/or empirical evidence that there is an optimal 
composition for all companies which could be ‘templated’ by regulation.  Despite this, the 
PGCG Principle 2 clearly templates board composition. 
 
 The primary recommendation, regarding board composition, examined in this paper 
Principle 2: Structure of the Board to add value Recommendation 2.1, A majority of the board 
should be independent directors.24 Other composition requirements of an independent chair and 
independent committees flow from this.  
  
 While the Corporations Act does not require any of the ten principles including 
independent directors, it has long been recommended, listed companies should have a majority 
of non-executive directors with an appropriate mix of skills and experience (Bosch Committee 
1995).25  Independent directors have been defined as those not having been employed or 
contracted to the company in the last three years, not a material supplier, customer, substantial 
shareholder or in any other relationship with the company and has not served on the board for an 
‘extended’ period.26 Legally the role of chair and CEO is not required to be separated, but 
corporate governance recommendations (Bosch 1995, Investment and Financial Services 
Association 1999) have strongly suggested the separation of roles to avoid possible conflicts. 
CLERP9 amendments do not contain any provisions concerning to director independence per se, 
                                               
24 See Appendix 1 for the full list of Principles and Recommendations. 
 
25 The term ‘independent’ director is relatively new. PGCG 9.1 lists three categories of directors: executive, non-
executive or independent. 
 
26 ASX Corporate Governance Council outlines a number of factors that potentially operate to disqualify a director 




but require a two year cooling of period for former auditors.27 Given the miss-alignment between 
the empirical evidence on optimal board composition and the current regulatory development, 
we predict a relation between board independence and firm characteristics that theory would 
support should influence independence.    
 
3. Sample Selection and Research Design  
 
 
3.1  Sample Selection and Data 
 The sample consists of 439 firms drawn from the UTS Corporate Governance Database 
for the years 2001 and 2007.28 The sample includes all companies that have been in the “S&P 
Top 100 Index” (large) during the sample period and a random selection from other listed 
companies divided into S&P 101-300, (medium) 301-500 (small) and below 500 (very small). 
Thus companies that have joined or left an Index are included in that Index as a means of 
addressing any survival or recent bias. Independence is examined in these two years and where 
lagged firm characteristics are required the data from 2000 and 2006 is used. Although the 
PGCG applies to all S&P Top 500 companies there may appear no reason to eliminate any 
companies. Due to specific reporting requirements or financial structure, consistent with prior 
studies we have eliminated some companies because of their reporting requirements, financial 
structure or unavailability of data.29 30 In this study foreign domiciled firms and trusts are 
                                               
27 A mandatory two year cooling off period before a retired partner, director or member of the audit company can 
become a director or take a senior management position with the former client and a prohibition against more than 
one retired auditors on the clients board or senior management. 
 
28 Company size is measured by market capitalization and listed on the Connect 4 database.  
 
29 E.g. Matolcsy and Wright 2006 deleted investment trusts and managed funds because of their special reporting 
requirements. 
 
30  Corporate Governance rules apart from audit committees apply to the S&P Top 500 companies.  
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eliminated because of their unusual firm financial characteristics or because of their special 
reporting requirements. Regulated industries, such as applies to utility firms in the US (Meeks 
1995 and Ferguson 2002) or the finance industry in Australia and industries with special 
reporting requirements such as managed funds (Lim 2007). De-listed firms and firms without 
annual reports are also eliminated. This provides a total 439 firm. Table 1 summarises the sample 
selection process and the descriptive statistics of the sample. 
Table 1 (about here) 
 
3.2  Research Design: Definition of Variables 
 In this study the dependent variable is the percentage of independent directors.31 Other 
board composition recommendations are contained in the PGCG, but central to each is the 
independence of the board. While seventy eight percent of boards in this study are majority 
independent in 2001 and eighty eight percent in 2007 as shown in Matolcsy (2008) the median 
level of board independence remained at seventy five percent over the period.32 Because the 
PGCG were released in April 2003, this study compares the board composition in the pre-
regulation period of 2001 to the post-regulation period of 2007. Although the regulation requests 
a majority of the board to be independent, the clear implication is the more independent the 
board the better. This study begins by adopting the simple executive / non-executive dichotomy 
rather than a more sophisticated, but also more subjective classification of executive / grey / 
independent (e.g Lim 2007), or measures of other director attributes such as outside director 
‘expertise’ (e.g Gul and Leung 2004). Later sensitivity analysis examines independence by 
                                               
31 While the PGCG requires a majority of the board to be independent, the recommendation is clearly for more 
independent..  
 
32 Matolcsy (2008) Table 2 shows the mean level of independence increased significantly as did the mean and 
medium levels of independence for more restrictive designations of independence (Tables 7, 8 & 9) 
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excluding non-executive directors with related party transactions and affiliation with a 
substantial shareholder, associations specifically identified in the PGCG as potentially 
compromising independence. From 2004 Australian companies have been required to provide 
the independence and executive status of directors, before this time only executive status was 
required, although independence was sometimes nominated or may have been able to be 
estimated from the limited information (voluntary) disclosed. Because of the change in reporting 
requirements it is likely some estimates and disclosures of independence will differ from the 
disclosed independent status in the latter years. Although the PGCG provide directions as to 
matters that may indicate non-independence, the classification is ultimately at the discretion of 
the board. In a prior study the highest correlation with self classification was non-executive not 
affiliated with a substantial shareholder. The more common exclusion of related parties resulted 
in a lower correlation than the simple non-executive dichotomy. The percentage of non-
executive directors is therefore used first as the dependent variable. 
 
 The independent variables are the firm characteristics which indicate the need for a board 
composition that reduces agency costs by separating the ‘decision control’ (ratification and 
monitoring of the decisions) from the ‘decision management’ (initiation and implementation of 
the decisions) or firm characteristics that provide a substitute for board independence.  
 
 Firm size would be expected to have the major impact on governance factors including 
the percentage of independent directors. Firm size is also critical in the application of the PGCG, 
with most of the regulation applying to the top 500 companies and the change in audit committee 
requirements applying to the top 300. Large firms face higher political costs and are likely to 
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compensate with more independent directors. Equally larger companies can afford larger boards, 
director and board cost represent a smaller percentage of their total expenses (or profits) and the 
larger the board the greater the room for independent directors and the greater the chance of 
majority independent boards.33 Because of both the regulation and the economic impact of size, 
the sample is subdivided according to market capitalization and more specific size/complexity 
firm characteristics are included in the right hand variables.  
 
 Board size is likely to be a significant determinate of the level of board independence. 
Larger firms usually have larger boards, but this is not the only factor determining board size. 
Matolcsy (2008) showed board size has remained remarkably stable over the period, with median 
boards of 5 and mean boards of 5.79 and 5.80 in 2001 and 2007 respectively (Table 2). The 
larger the board, the greater the opportunity to appoint independent directors. While most boards 
would include the CEO many may also have the CFO and possibly the operations manager (say 
the chief engineer or geologist) depending on the qualifications and experience of the CEO. It 
may be difficult to justify the need to include more executives on the board when they are 
available to be in attendance when their expertise is required. It is therefore predicted the larger 
the board the more independent the board.  
 
 While board size provides the opportunity for more independent directors, shareholder 
concentration (Cooke, 1992; Ho and Wong, 2001; Chua and Gray, 2002) provides an alternate 
monitoring mechanism. This is consistent, but not the same as Gerry Harvey’s concept of 
corporate governance, where he contends his interest as a majority shareholder reduces (or 
                                               
33 For boards with three or four directors, a second executive director robs the board of majority independence. 
While boards of seven or more allows at least three directors to be executives.    
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removes) the agency problem. Board representation by a director affiliated with a substantial 
shareholder may align the board’s incentives with all shareholders, or it may only align it with 
specific shareholders. Therefore board representation may or may not indicate the need for 
particular board composition but the higher the shareholder concentration, the less need for 
independent directors to protect these more powerful shareholders’ interests. Institutional 
investors may have a policy of not being involved in management and simply selling shares in 
companies that do not perform in accordance to their expectations, but the discipline imposed by 
a high level of shareholder concentration leads to the prediction of lower levels of board 
independence.  
 
 Larker et al (2007) draws comprehensively on previous research and provides a number 
of governance and firm characteristics which are significantly associated with managerial 
decision making and organizational performance. Consistent with their findings, other 
researchers (e.g. Denis and Sarin 1999) have found size to be significantly associated with board 
composition. It is unclear which aspect of size is the driving factor in corporate governance. In 
this study complexity and size are measured using subsidiaries and assets. Larger firms are 
exposed to more public scrutiny (Watts and Zimmerman 1978), and may reduce the costs 
associated with this with more independent boards. Large firms are likely to have more complex 
operations and require a larger range of expertise on the board resulting in larger boards. The 
complexity of the business operations is also likely to influence the range of skills needed by the 
directors, although size may be closely associated with complexity, consistent with Lim (2007) 
the number of subsidiaries and foreign subsidiaries has been chosen as the proxies for 
complexity. While Lim (2007) found more complex companies had a positive and significant 
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relation to cash but not equity CEO compensation, this study predicts more complex firms need 
more independent boards to separate the ‘decision control’ from the ‘decision management’. 
Consistent with Gul (2007) and Arthur (2001) the natural log of total assets are used as the 
accounting measure of size.  
 
 Measures of profitability, the most common, return on equity and or return on assets have 
been extensively used in previous studies (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Camfferman and Cook, 
2002; Bushman and Smith 2001). Some have also included an earnings noise measure, being the 
standard deviation of the return over the last three years.  
 
 Leverage has been used in a number of studies (Harris and Raviv 1988) and recently in 
Hong Kong Ferguson et al (2002) and in Australia Lim (2006). Although high levels of debt 
provide a monitoring through debt contracts, financial institutions are likely to require directors 
nominated by the institution34 or more independence of the board, again to need to separate the 
‘decision control’ from the ‘decision management’. In a similar vein current ratio may also 
indicate an aspect of financial risk or distress. Gul and Leung 2004 – although they do not say 
why, use the current ratio in their Hong Kong study. Loss making firms, because of the 
imperative of survival have consistently been shown to exhibit different firm characteristics, and 
in the regulatory environment in Australia have been used as examples of ‘what not to do’.  
 
Lim (2007) reports growth option measures (market to book) were associated with higher CEO 
compensation.  Smith and Watts (1992) find the cost of monitoring managers is positively 
                                               
34 It may be argued directors nominated by financial institutions with a significant debt investment in a company 
may not be considered to be independent.  
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related to growth opportunities, and removing duality will have greater capital market impact for 
high growth firms verses low growth firms. Although high growth firms may need a 
management structure that has the ability and authority to respond rapidly to changing market 
conditions, the need to separate the ‘decision control’ from the ‘decision management’ would 
appear greater in these firms. Therefore we predict a positive relation between growth options (as 
measured by the market-to-book ratio) and the independence of the board.  
 
 Auditor quality has been used extensively in financial accounting research and voluntary 
disclosure studies in New Zealand (Hossain et al., 1995) and Australia (Coulton and Taylor, 
2003; Lim, 2007).  
 
 The more highly levered a firm the more likely lenders will require monitoring by 
independent directors. While compliance with debt covenants is the responsibility of the trustee, 
using audited financial statements, the more independent the board the less likely the firm will 
engage in transactions aimed at circumventing covenants. Given the equal legal liability of all 
directors, independent directors are more likely to ensure the company does not trade while 
insolvent. 
 
 Finally the industry in which a company primarily operates may also influence the 
independence of the board. Industries that face less public scrutiny and more straight forward 
operations would be expected to have more independent boards. Because of the relatively recent 
deregulation of telecommunications & utilities and the impact of financial firms they may be 
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expected to have more independent boards than energy & mining, manufacturers and retailers. 
The industry descriptive statistics for 2001 and 2005 are shown in Tables 5  
 
 Section 2 summarised the theoretical discussion on the firm characteristics that are 
expected to influence board compositions.  Specifically, the theoretical literature cited discusses 
the firm characteristics that could lead to the need for more independent boards.  As discussed 
above, the firm characteristics suggested to drive the need for independent boards were firms that 
are larger, face more political costs, have higher leverage and more growth options, it is 
relatively more difficult to monitor the managers through the ex-post accounting-based 
performance measures, and thus these firms are expected to have a higher proportion of 
independent directors.  Theory suggests conflicting opinion regarding substantial shareholding 
and high quality auditors, either may serve as a substitute for monitoring provided by 
independent directors or may pressure firms to adopt ‘best practice’ and are therefore likely to be 
associated with boards that reflect the most up to date corporate governance thinking. All firm 
characteristic variables are measured the year prior to that in which the board composition is 
measured as they are expected to influence the composition of the board (rather than the reverse). 
 
 Thus these firm characteristics may provide some explanation as to board composition, 
and this study tests whether the composition differ in firms with different firm characteristics and 
differ before and after the introduction of the corporate governance regulations. The 
measurement of the firm characteristics is described in the table below.  
 
 22




Variable name Proxy used 




Negative Top20 SHt-1 
 
Percentage of shares owned by 
the top 20 shareholders 
Complexity 1 Positive Complexity 1 t-1 Number of subsidiaries 
Complexity 2 Positive Complexity 2 t-1 Number of foreign subsidiaries 
Size Positive Sizet-1 Natural log of total assets 
Market to book Negative MktBk t-1 Market value of equity / book 
value of equity 
Leverage Positive Levt-1 Total Non-current Liabilities / 
Total Assets 
Liquidity Negative Liq t-1 Current assets / current 
liabilities 
Auditor Positive Aud t-1 1 if big 4/5, 0 otherwise 
Loss Positive Loss t-1 1 if net profit was negative, 0 
otherwise  
Industry Positive Financial 1 if firm is predominately in the 
sector according to the ASX 
two digit classification, 0 
otherwise. 






 Correlation matrices for of the above variables for 2001 and 2007 and for the lagged 
variables in 2000 and 2006 are shown in Table 6. The relation between board independence and 
firm characteristics is tested for the hypothesis for all firms in the pre-regulation period (2001) 
and the post regulation period (2007) for market capitalization in four size categories and with 






4.1 General Results 
 Consistent with Arthur (1997) and Cotter (2003) we find an association between firm 
characteristics and the level of board independence. 
 
 In Table 1 the relation between board independence (independence designated of non-
executive) and firm characteristics is relatively weak with adjusted R2 of around 16% for both 
years and both OLS and step wise regressions. While if the designation of independence is non-
executive without an association with a substantial shareholders (the designation closest to ‘self 
classification) the improvement in R2 is substantial in 2001 but remains around the mid teens in 
2007, as shown in Table 2.  Results for two other independent designations of independence 
(non-executive without related parties and without both related parties and substantial 
shareholder association) unreported have R2 of around 10% or lower. 
 
 When the sample is divided by size and independence designation Table 3 shows the best 
association is for Top 100 firms with independence designated as non-executive and no 
association with a substantial shareholder the R2 of mid forties are revealed. This result is 
consistent with the associations found by Wright (2006) or (Lim 2007) and Linck (2008). For the 
top 100 firms, all designations of independence show a decreasing association of firm 
characteristics with the level of independence over the sample period except the more restrictive 
designation of independence as non-executive without both related party and association with a 
substantial shareholder. Table 4 reveals the reverse. The same reversal is seen for firms in the 
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Above 500 for the tightest designation of independence (R2 in 2001 of 0.048 and 0.085 (OSL 
and step wise) and 0.137 and 0.158 respectively in 2007). 
 
 While the results are not consistent across firm size and independence designation groups 
Table 5 reveals when 2007 is the interactive term the best association is when independence is 
defined as non-executive without substantial shareholder association. No single characteristic 
except Teleco and Utility industry group is significantly associated with all four independence 
designations. 
 
 Self classification of independence in 2007 for the subsample of the 352 firms in which 
the classification of director independence was possible reveals similar R2 of around the low 
teens with the (unreported) highest R2 achieved on the reduced sample (352 firms 2007) of 
16.6% for independence designated as non-executive and not executive in last 3 years. The 
lowest R2 of 3.3% was for independence designated as non-executive and a director for less than 
10 years. 
 
 The results do not show a consistent pattern either over time or for different designations 
of independence. In general all that can be said is the smaller the firm the weaker the association 
of the level of board independence to firm characteristics, but that association may have 
improved over time. Pooled results provide a more consistent story of a decreasing association 
but hide the richness of the data, Consistent with Matolcsy (2008) the story is not one of a 
consistent relation and reaction but one based on firm size. The introduction of a regulation 
setting minimum standards which may firms already met and allowing an ‘if not why not’ escape 
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was likely to produce mixed reactions. If success of the regulation was to be judged by the closer 
association of board independence with firm characteristics then this may have happened for 
larger firms, but the designation of independence becomes critical. Curiously it appears the firms 
not targeted by the regulation (Beyond 500) changed board composition to align with firm 
characteristics.   
  
 Further the PGCG appear to have had little impact on the relation between firm 
characteristics and the percentage of board independence. Over the six year period Table 3 
shows a consistent explanatory power of only around sixteen percent, although the variables that 
are significant change over the period. The only variable to remain highly significant over the 
period is the ‘financial industry. In Table 3 independence is designated as ‘non-executive’ 
Consistent with prior research three other independence designations were tested using more 
restrictive definitions. For non-executive directors with no related party transactions the 
explanatory power increased from three percent in 2001 to ten percent in 2007 while 
independence designated as non-executive with no related party transactions and no affiliation 
with a substantial shareholder the explanatory power increased from seven and eight percent to 
eleven and twelve percent. The designation most closely aligned with ‘self classification’ is non-
executive with no affiliation with a substantial shareholder. Table 4 shows a decrease in the 
explanatory power from twenty four percent down to fifteen percent. Not withstanding the 
change in  R2  
 
 Attention now shifts to the multivariate analysis and considers the relation between firm 
characteristics and board independence in a pre and post regulatory environment. Board size, 
financial firms and leverage are positively related to independence in 2001. These remain in 
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2007 when auditors become significant. The original assertion that ‘one size does not fit all’ was 
driven by substantial increases and decreases.  
 
4.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
 Given ‘independence’ is a state of mind, independence could only be determined by 
knowing the mind of each non-executive director.35 Even an examination of board minutes 
would only reveal some of the discussion and votes taken. From this it may be possible to infer 
which non-executive directors are not acting independently. The definition is potentially reduced 
in the post regulation period were companies are required to label directors. Although guidelines 
are provided the definition of independence is likely to vary between companies.36 Any 
classification by a researcher will be similarly subjective, but without the incentives some 
companies may have in their classifications. Further, classification is limited by the information 
supplied, beyond the basics required by cumulative regulation of company disclosure, some 
companies may have incentives to provide or not provide particular facts.37 Further analysis of 
board composition variables, beyond percentage independence needs to be carried out. In 
Australia information on ‘related party transactions’ has been used refine the classification 
beyond “executive” “non-executive”. The results in Table 6 show little relation between self 
classification of independence and firm characteristics, although top 20 shareholders, size and 
auditor were significantly associated.  
                                               
35 In all known jurisdictions executive directors are automatically classified as non-independent. 
 
36 ASX Corporate Governance Council PGCG p20 lists seven items that may be used in assessing independence, 
including substantial shareholding, executive or advisor in the last three years, not a major supplier etc. 
 
37 Prior to 2004 companies were required to provide the age (date of birth) of the directors, the number of meetings 
attended (and the number of eligible meetings the director could have attended), the remuneration, when the director 
was appointed, the executive position in the company (if any) and other directorships. 
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5.  Limitations and Conclusions 
 
 While the definition of independence can always be challenged, the removal of non-
executive directors with both related party transactions and substantial shareholdings does little 
except to reduce both the percentages in each size sub-sample and the relation between board 
composition and firm characteristics. 
 
 Unlike previous studies the relation between board independence and firm characteristics 
appears weak, both before and after the introduction of the PGCG regulation in 2003. The lack of 
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Table 1: Board Independence (2001 & 2007; full sample of 432 firms for two years) 
 
LHS variable is level of board independence, with independence designated as non-executive 
 
    Panel A: 2001 full 
Panel B: 2001 
stepwise Panel C: 2007 full Panel D: stepwise 
  Pred Coeff. 
p-
value   Coeff. 
p-
value   Coeff. 
p-
value   Coeff. 
p-
value   
Constant + 0.328 0.011 ** 0.393 0.000 *** 0.523 0.000 *** 0.596 0.000 *** 
Board Size + 0.021 0.000 *** 0.021 0.000 *** 0.008 0.109  0.010 0.010 ** 
Top 20 SH % - -0.002 0.958     -0.052 0.192      
Complexity 1 + -0.001 0.098 *    0.000 0.510      
Compelxity 2 + 0.001 0.233     0.000 0.641      
Size + 0.011 0.157  0.009 0.067 * 0.006 0.307      
MktBk + -0.001 0.745     -0.003 0.386      
Lev + 0.070 0.224     0.111 0.033 ** 0.106 0.020 ** 
Liquidity - 0.001 0.581     0.000 0.799      
Auditor + 0.018 0.354     0.059 0.001 *** 0.060 0.000 *** 
Loss + 0.023 0.296     0.027 0.164      
Financial + 0.110 0.000 *** 0.097 0.000 *** 0.123 0.000 *** 0.115 0.000 *** 
Telco & Utility - -0.079 0.141  -0.082 0.111  0.090 0.046 ** 0.080 0.058 * 
Manufacturing + 0.025 0.360     0.002 0.921      
Retail - -0.040 0.221  -0.060 0.043 ** 0.034 0.230      
Service + 0.013 0.593     0.027 0.176      
                 
Adj R2   0.159 0.000 *** 0.164 0.000 *** 0.150 0.000 *** 0.157 0.000 *** 
 
  
*** p < 1%, ** p < 5%, * p < 10%  
   
         
Board Size : Number of directors on the board  
Top 20 SH % : % of shares owned by the largest 20 shareholders        
Complexity 1 : Total number of subsidiaries        
Complexity 2 : Number of foreign subsidiaries        
Size : Natural log of total assets        
MktBk : Market value of equity / book value of equity      
Lev : Non-current liabilities / total assets         
Liquidity : Current assets / current liabilities        
Loss : 1 if net profit was negative; 0 otherwise       
Financial : 1 if firm is predominantly in the financial services sector, 0 otherwise   
Telco & Utility : 1 if firm is predominantly in the telecommunication or utility sectors, 0 otherwise    
Manufacturing : 1 if firm is predominantly involved in manufacturing, 0 otherwise     
Retail : 1 if firm is predominantly involved in retail, 0 otherwise     




Table 2: Board Independence (2001 & 2007; full sample of 432 firms for two years) 
 
LHS variable is level of board independence, with independence designated as non-executive with no affiliation 
with a substantial shareholder 
 
    Panel A: 2001 full 
Panel B: 2001 
stepwise Panel C: 2007 full Panel D: stepwise 
  Pred Coeff. 
p-
value   Coeff. 
p-
value   Coeff. 
p-
value   Coeff. 
p-
value   
Constant + 0.048 0.747  -0.010 0.937  0.407 0.001 *** 0.335 0.001 *** 
Board Size + 0.011 0.117  0.011 0.085 * 0.004 0.554      
Top 20 SH % - -0.320 0.000 *** -0.316 0.000 *** -0.239 0.000 *** -0.238 0.000 *** 
Complexity 1 + -0.001 0.059 * -0.001 0.053 * 0.000 0.605      
Compelxity 2 + 0.003 0.040 ** 0.002 0.047 ** 0.002 0.094 * 0.002 0.019 ** 
Size + 0.033 0.000 *** 0.037 0.000 *** 0.011 0.128  0.018 0.001 *** 
MktBk + 0.007 0.042 ** 0.009 0.014 ** 0.001 0.860      
Lev + 0.052 0.437     0.081 0.237      
Liquidity - 0.000 0.867     0.003 0.240      
Auditor + 0.014 0.530     0.073 0.002 *** 0.075 0.002 *** 
Loss + 0.032 0.217  0.032 0.189  0.038 0.129  0.046 0.059 * 
Financial + 0.031 0.361     0.047 0.164  0.052 0.090 * 
Telco & Utility - -0.115 0.062 * -0.137 0.021 ** 0.080 0.182  0.089 0.120   
Manufacturing + 0.032 0.315     -0.010 0.758      
Retail - 0.000 0.993     0.082 0.029 ** 0.083 0.021 ** 
Service + 0.033 0.225     0.032 0.225  0.038 0.109   
                 
Adj R2   0.240 0.000 *** 0.246 0.000 *** 0.144 0.000 *** 0.151 0.000 *** 
 
*** p < 1%, ** p < 5%, * p < 10%      
            
Board Size : Number of directors on the board        
Top 20 SH % : % of shares owned by the largest 20 shareholders     
Complexity 1 : Total number of subsidiaries        
Complexity 2 : Number of foreign subsidiaries        
Size : Natural log of total assets        
MktBk : Market value of equity / book value of equity        
Lev : Non-current liabilities / total assets        
Liquidity : Current assets / current liabilities        
Loss : 1 if net profit was negative; 0 otherwise        
Financial : 1 if firm is predominantly in the financial services sector, 0 otherwise   
Telco & Utility : 1 if firm is predominantly in the telecommunication or utility sectors, 0 otherwise   
Manufacturing : 1 if firm is predominantly involved in manufacturing, 0 otherwise   
Retail : 1 if firm is predominantly involved in retail, 0 otherwise   




Table 3: Board Independence (2001 & 2007; 2001 Mkt cap Top 100 sample of 67 firms for two years) 
 
LHS variable is level of board independence, with independence designated as non-executive with no 
affiliation with a substantial shareholder 
 
    Panel A: 2001 full 
Panel B: 2001 
stepwise Panel C: 2007 full Panel D: stepwise 
  Pred Coeff. 
p-
value   Coeff. 
p-
value   Coeff. 
p-
value   Coeff. 
p-
value   
Constant + 1.155 0.019 ** 1.229 0.000 *** 0.776 0.093 * 0.620 0.059 * 
Board Size + -0.004 0.730     -0.036 0.003 *** -0.038 0.000 *** 
Top 20 SH % - -0.728 0.000 *** -0.693 0.000 *** -0.454 0.001 *** -0.416 0.001 *** 
Complexity 1 + -0.001 0.294     0.001 0.196  0.001 0.085 * 
Compelxity 2 + 0.003 0.040 ** 0.002 0.009 *** 0.001 0.456      
Size + 0.009 0.680     0.022 0.299  0.027 0.057 * 
MktBk + -0.001 0.917     0.013 0.158  0.014 0.117   
Lev + 0.114 0.432     -0.050 0.720      
Liquidity - -0.016 0.362     -0.001 0.878      
Auditor + -0.153 0.148  -0.158 0.073 * 0.000 1.000      
Loss + 0.000 0.995     -0.067 0.390  -0.093 0.182   
Financial + -0.098 0.119     -0.046 0.526      
Telco & Utility - -0.060 0.568     -0.124 0.255      
Manufacturing + 0.082 0.211  0.091 0.056 * -0.063 0.371      
Retail - -0.161 0.152  -0.168 0.059 * -0.111 0.330      
Service + -0.048 0.413     -0.054 0.364      
                 
Adj R2   0.458 0.000 *** 0.488 0.000 *** 0.309 0.001 *** 0.360 0.000 *** 
 
*** p < 1%, ** p < 5%, * p < 10%      
            
Board Size : Number of directors on the board        
Top 20 SH % : % of shares owned by the largest 20 shareholders     
Complexity 1 : Total number of subsidiaries        
Complexity 2 : Number of foreign subsidiaries        
Size : Natural log of total assets        
MktBk : Market value of equity / book value of equity        
Lev : Non-current liabilities / total assets        
Liquidity : Current assets / current liabilities        
Loss : 1 if net profit was negative; 0 otherwise        
Financial : 1 if firm is predominantly in the financial services sector, 0 otherwise   
Telco & Utility : 1 if firm is predominantly in the telecommunication or utility sectors, 0 otherwise   
Manufacturing : 1 if firm is predominantly involved in manufacturing, 0 otherwise   
Retail : 1 if firm is predominantly involved in retail, 0 otherwise   




Table 4: Board Independence (2001 & 2007; 2001 Mkt cap Top 100 sample of 67 firms for two years) 
 
LHS variable is level of board independence, with independence designated as non-executive with no related party 
transactions and no affiliation with a substantial shareholder 
 
    Panel A: 2001 full 
Panel B: 2001 
stepwise Panel C: 2007 full Panel D: stepwise 
  Pred Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value   
Constant + 0.308 0.736  0.805 0.000 *** 0.982 0.120  1.092 0.000 *** 
Board Size + -0.006 0.781     -0.015 0.347  -0.017 0.182   
Top 20 SH % - -0.331 0.153  -0.289 0.164  -0.678 0.000 *** -0.683 0.000 *** 
Complexity 1 + -0.003 0.121  -0.002 0.113  0.000 0.917      
Compelxity 2 + 0.007 0.004 *** 0.007 0.001 *** 0.004 0.037 ** 0.004 0.004 *** 
Size + 0.027 0.503     0.004 0.899      
MktBk + -0.029 0.067 * -0.032 0.005 *** 0.025 0.056 * 0.025 0.032 ** 
Lev + 0.027 0.922     0.067 0.729      
Liquidity - -0.020 0.564     -0.003 0.774      
Auditor + -0.028 0.889     0.000 1.000      
Loss + 0.099 0.490     -0.134 0.207  -0.126 0.179   
Financial + -0.131 0.270  -0.117 0.180  0.019 0.853      
Telco & Utility - 0.112 0.579     -0.011 0.940      
Manufacturing + 0.028 0.823     -0.124 0.200  -0.122 0.100   
Retail - 0.136 0.523     -0.114 0.464      
Service + 0.053 0.636     -0.096 0.239  -0.085 0.186   
                 
Adj R2   0.139 0.078 * 0.226 0.001 *** 0.278 0.003 *** 0.352 0.000 *** 
LHS variable is level of board independence, with independence designated as non-executive with no related party 
transactions and no affiliation with a substantial shareholder 
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Table 5: Change of Board Independence (2001 - 2007; 432 firms for two years; full regressions) 
 
    Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D 
  Pred Coeff. 
p-
value   Coeff. 
p-
value   Coeff. 
p-
value   Coeff. 
p-
value   
Constant + 0.328 0.006 *** 0.402 0.036 ** 0.048 0.744  0.202 0.271   
Board Size + 0.021 0.000 *** 0.017 0.048 ** 0.011 0.113  0.009 0.301   
Top 20 SH % - -0.002 0.955  0.052 0.398  -0.320 0.000 *** -0.190 0.001 *** 
Complexity 1 + -0.001 0.076 * -0.001 0.188  -0.001 0.056 * -0.001 0.162   
Compelxity 2 + 0.001 0.200  0.004 0.010 *** 0.003 0.038 ** 0.005 0.002 *** 
Size + 0.011 0.129  -0.002 0.853  0.033 0.000 *** 0.015 0.183   
MktBk + -0.001 0.726  -0.006 0.214  0.007 0.040 ** 0.001 0.863   
Lev + 0.070 0.192  -0.103 0.230  0.052 0.432  -0.111 0.175   
Liquidity - 0.001 0.554  -0.002 0.345  0.000 0.866  -0.003 0.261   
Auditor + 0.018 0.319  0.042 0.156  0.014 0.526  0.023 0.412   
Loss + 0.023 0.261  0.026 0.427  0.032 0.213  0.021 0.498   
Financial + 0.110 0.000 *** 0.110 0.013 ** 0.031 0.357  0.061 0.146   
Telco & Utility - -0.079 0.113  -0.060 0.447  -0.115 0.060 * -0.088 0.249   
Manufacturing + 0.025 0.325  0.040 0.325  0.032 0.311  0.052 0.182   
Retail - -0.040 0.188  -0.069 0.161  0.000 0.993  -0.024 0.604   
Service + 0.013 0.566  -0.020 0.574  0.033 0.220  0.005 0.870   
Year 2007 + 0.195 0.212  0.123 0.623  0.359 0.061 * 0.183 0.443   
Year 2007 * Board Size - -0.013 0.081 * -0.015 0.219  -0.007 0.474  -0.005 0.655   
Year 2007 * Top 20 SH % + -0.050 0.391  -0.190 0.039 ** 0.080 0.257  -0.038 0.667   
Year 2007 * Complex 1 - 0.001 0.361  0.000 0.920  0.002 0.078 * 0.000 0.705   
Year 2007 * Complex 2 - -0.001 0.522  -0.002 0.468  -0.001 0.707  -0.001 0.520   
Year 2007 * Size - -0.005 0.573  0.002 0.882  -0.021 0.065 * -0.010 0.502   
Year 2007 * MktBk - -0.002 0.677  0.023 0.002 *** -0.007 0.263  0.015 0.041 ** 
Year 2007 * Lev - 0.041 0.600  0.311 0.012 ** 0.030 0.757  0.280 0.018 ** 
Year 2007 * Liquidity + -0.001 0.583  0.001 0.822  0.003 0.414  0.003 0.400   
Year 2007 * Auditor - 0.041 0.126  0.024 0.582  0.059 0.071 * 0.049 0.233   
Year 2007 * Loss - 0.003 0.911  -0.061 0.193  0.007 0.854  -0.026 0.565   
Year 2007 * Financial - 0.013 0.742  0.022 0.728  0.015 0.746  0.033 0.576   
Year 2007 * Telco & Utili + 0.169 0.016 ** 0.223 0.046 ** 0.195 0.023 ** 0.226 0.034 ** 
Year 2007 * Manufact - -0.023 0.527  -0.004 0.948  -0.041 0.351  -0.050 0.364   
Year 2007 * Retail + 0.074 0.087 * 0.099 0.151  0.082 0.122  0.087 0.191   
Year 2007 * Service - 0.014 0.641  0.045 0.357  -0.001 0.979  0.012 0.802   
Adj R2   0.163 0.000 *** 0.081 0.000 *** 0.209 0.000 *** 0.120 0.000 *** 
 
LHS variable is level of board independence 
Panel A: independence designated as non-executive 
Panel B: independence designated as non-executive with no related party transactions 
Panel C: independence designated as non-executive with no affiliation with a substantial shareholder 




Table 6: Board Independence (Full sample of 352 firms for 2007) 
 
LHS variable is level of board independence, independence designated as self classification 
 
    Panel A: full Panel B: stepwise 
  Pred Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value   
Constant + 0.269 0.056 * 0.284 0.001 *** 
Board Size + -0.003 0.689      
Top 20 SH % - -0.236 0.000 *** -0.228 0.000 *** 
Complexity 1 + 0.000 0.826      
Compelxity 2 + 0.001 0.255      
Size + 0.021 0.012 ** 0.022 0.000 *** 
MktBk + 0.001 0.798      
Lev + 0.005 0.949      
Liquidity - -0.001 0.697      
Auditor + 0.077 0.004 *** 0.076 0.004 *** 
Loss + 0.020 0.497      
Financial + 0.057 0.129      
Telco & Utility - -0.060 0.401      
Manufacturing + 0.043 0.226      
Retail - 0.030 0.484      
Service + 0.045 0.137      
           
Adj R2   0.114 0.000 *** 0.125 0.000 *** 
 
*** p < 1%, ** p < 5%, * p < 10%       
 
